Emergent bipartiteness in a society of knights and knaves

We propose a simple model of a social network based on so-called knights-and-knaves puzzles. The model describes the formation of networks between two classes of agents where links are formed by agents introducing their neighbours to others of their own class. We show that if the proportion of knights and knaves is within a certain range, the network self-organizes to a perfectly bipartite state. However, if the excess of one of the two classes is greater than a threshold value, bipartiteness is not observed. We offer a detailed theoretical analysis for the behaviour of the model, investigate its behaviou r in the thermodynamic limit, and argue that it provides a simple example of a topology-driven model whose behaviour is strongly reminiscent of a first-order phase transitions far from equilibrium.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figure

Efficient Implementation and the Product State Representation of Numbers

The relation between the requirement of efficient implementability and the product state representation of numbers is examined. Numbers are defined to be any model of the axioms of number theory or arithmetic. Efficient implementability (EI) means that the basic arithmetic operations are physically implementable and the space-time and thermodynamic resources needed to carry out the implementations are polynomial in the range of numbers considered. Different models of numbers are described to show the independence of both EI and the product state representation from the axioms. The relation between EI and the product state representation is examined. It is seen that the condition of a product state representation does not imply EI. Arguments used to refute the converse implication, EI implies a product state representation, seem reasonable; but they are not conclusive. Thus this implication remains an open question.Comment: Paragraph in page proof for Phys. Rev. A revise

Rejection in Łukasiewicz's and Słupecki's Sense

The idea of rejection originated by Aristotle. The notion of rejection was introduced into formal logic by Łukasiewicz [20]. He applied it to complete syntactic characterization of deductive systems using an axiomatic method of rejection of propositions [22, 23]. The paper gives not only genesis, but also development and generalization of the notion of rejection. It also emphasizes the methodological approach to biaspectual axiomatic method of characterization of deductive systems as acceptance (asserted) systems and rejection (refutation) systems, introduced by Łukasiewicz and developed by his student Słupecki, the pioneers of the method, which becomes relevant in modern approaches to logic

Complex type 4 structure changing dynamics of digital agents: Nash equilibria of a game with arms race in innovations

The new digital economy has renewed interest in how digital agents can innovate. This follows the legacy of John von Neumann dynamical systems theory on complex biological systems as computation. The Gödel-Turing-Post (GTP) logic is shown to be necessary to generate innovation based structure changing Type 4 dynamics of the Wolfram-Chomsky schema. Two syntactic procedures of GTP logic permit digital agents to exit from listable sets of digital technologies to produce novelty and surprises. The first is meta-analyses or offline simulations. The second is a fixed point with a two place encoding of negation or opposition, referred to as the Gödel sentence. It is postulated that in phenomena ranging from the genome to human proteanism, the Gödel sentence is a ubiquitous syntactic construction without which escape from hostile agents qua the Liar is impossible and digital agents become entrained within fixed repertoires. The only recursive best response function of a 2-person adversarial game that can implement strategic innovation in lock-step formation of an arms race is the productive function of the Emil Post [58] set theoretic proof of the Gödel incompleteness result. This overturns the view of game theorists that surprise and innovation cannot be a Nash equilibrium of a game